Multiculturalism in Brazil, Bolivia and Peru.

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Summary

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The aim of this article is to analyze the different strategies of cultural resistance employed by discriminated ethnic groups in Brazil, Peru and Bolivia. Brazilian Afro movements and indigenous populations are increasingly fighting against the discrimination they have always been subject to and developing their own specific cultural identities, while at the same time demystifying the idea of Brazilian national identity as a racial democracy. In Peru and Bolivia something similar is happening; indigenous populations are challenging the generally accepted idea of integration through miscegenation (racial mixing) and Bolivia has just elected its first indigenous president. Assimilation through miscegenation was the apparent solution that worked in most Latin American countries since the building of the nation-states. Its positive side was that a peaceful interethnic relationship was constructed. The negative side of this solution, which is stressed in recent multicultural strategies, is that different ethnicities and cultures were accepted only as a part of this intermingling and rarely recognized as the target of discrimination.

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“Our world, and our lives, are being shaped by the conflicting trends of globalization and identity.” (Manuel Castells, The Power of Identity, 1997)

“How will the new constitution of Iraq satisfy demands for fair representation for Shiites and Kurds? Which—and how many—of the languages spoken in Afghanistan should the new constitution recognize as the official language of the state? How will the Nigerian federal court deal with a Sharia law ruling to punish adultery by death? Will the French legislature approve the proposal to ban headscarves and other religious symbols in public schools? Do Hispanics in the United States resist assimilation into the mainstream American culture? Will there be a peace accord to end fighting in Côte d’Ivoire? Will the President of Bolivia resign after mounting protests by indigenous people? Will the peace talks to end the Tamil-Sinhala conflict in Sri Lanka ever conclude? These are just some headlines from the past few months. Managing cultural diversity is one of the central challenges of our time.” (UNDP, Human Development Report 2004. Cultural Liberty in Today’s Diverse World)

Introduction

The first part of this article will explore the paradox of how Brazil, a country which identified for most of the twentieth century as a racial democracy, where the three main populations had integrated harmoniously — Indigenous, Blacks and Portuguese —, has come to acknowledge its deep problem of racism and is applying affirmative action to fight it back. Brazil’s last 1988 Constitution defines racism as a crime without bail for the first time in its history. On 1995, also for the first time, Brazilian state under the government of Fernando Henrique Cardoso accepted officially that the country suffered from the burden of racism. At present two laws based on affirmative action and racial quotas are being discussed on Congress and have originated one of the deepest public discussion about the race question.

The second part will explore how in Bolivia and Peru the indigenous population gained power, visibility and recognition of their cultural identity. Both Andean countries modified their Constitutions and officially accepted that they are multinational and multiethnic countries. The 1993 last Peruvian Constitution establishes that “the State recognizes and protects the ethnic and cultural plurality of the Nation”, acknowledges Quechua and Aymara as official languages, and admits customary law and collective property rights for indigenous populations. Bolivia is not behind, its 1994 Constitution defines the country as: “free, independent, sovereign, multiethnic and pluricultural”, the State also promotes bilingual education in Aymara, Quechua and Guarani; and protects customary law and collective property ownership of the land.
The third section of the paper will address why a comparative perspective gives us a better understanding of the changes towards multiculturalism that are occurring in these three countries. If at a first glance Brazil, with its large black and small indigenous populations looks completely different with Bolivia and Peru, two countries with very large indigenous but small black populations, a deeper view will find that a common turn towards multiculturalism is reshaping national identities in all three countries.

Brazil: The Myth of Racial Democracy

Is Brazil really a racial democracy? Has ethnic integration been successful? Do blacks and mulattos perform worse than whites? If they do perform worse, is this more a matter of economic class or is it the result of racial discrimination?

Until Gilberto Freyre’s book The Masters and the Slaves appeared in 1933, there were two dominant perspectives in Brazil about the country’s future, both deeply rooted in racial preconceptions which were very common in the Western world in the nineteenth century. One was the idea that the country’s viability depended heavily on the whitening of its population; the white race should impose itself on natives, blacks and racially mixed groups, and this process would take approximately a hundred and fifty years. The other view, even more bigoted than the first, was that the final product of mixed blood was a weak, lazy and lascivious individual, incapable of building a modern country, and so Brazil could not expect a prosperous future (Skidmore 1976; Benzaquen 1994).

The great revolution that Freyre brought about was that he made a virtue of what was perceived as a problem. In his view, it was precisely this miscegenation that gave Brazil its great potential and its unique cultural identity. The mixture of native, Afro and Portuguese cultures and races was exactly what the modernization and the future of the nation should be built on. He wrote: “it is not that in the Brazilian subsist, like in the Anglo American, two enemy halves: the white and the black; the ex master and the ex slave. We are two halves in fraternization that mutually enrich from diverse experiences and values: when we will complete in a whole, it will not be with the sacrifice of one element in detriment of the other. Lars Ringbom sees great possibilities in the culture of the mestizo, but reached a point in which one of the halves of its personality does not try to suppress the other. Brazil, it can be said, already has reached that point…” (Freyre 1989).

It was simpler to hold this view when there were still very few if any expressions at all of the native or Afro perspectives. Nowadays things are changing and these organized communities are constructing their own cultural identities, which nearly always do not match the idea of the nation that Freyre so successfully and brilliantly enthroned in a dominant position. One extremely significant symptom is that Afro organizations have chosen Zumbi as their ethnic symbol. He lived three hundred years ago and acquired fame as the leader of Palmares, the biggest “quilombo” (segregated communities of escaped slaves who resisted white domination). The national holiday for black movements is November 20th, the day of Zumbi’s death, which was made National Black Consciousness Day, rather than May 13th, the day slavery was abolished in 1888, which is now the official National Day Against Racism. Another symptom is that some of Brazil’s historical heroes like Duke of Caxias are now being strongly criticized
because of their negative treatment of blacks. Many studies have shown that in Brazil race and ethnicity are more important variables when it comes to explaining higher levels of poverty and discrimination against blacks than economic class, which was the dominant view for a number of decades. And these black and ethnic communities are now building their defenses on racial and ethnic bases. As one of the most respected leaders of the black movement, Abdias do Nascimento, put it many years ago: “Naturally, anything directed against the status quo runs risks. But Negros run risks from the instant of their birth. Do not fear the label of “black racist” because the product of intimidation is docility. Our historical experience shows us that antiracist racism is the only path capable of extinguishing the difference of the races” (do Nascimento 1968). This was written eighty years after the abolition of slavery in Brazil. Do Nascimento was at that time well aware of the civil rights movement in the USA, but he was not listened to because most Brazilian intellectuals thought that racism was not a problem in the country. He was accused of importing the problems of segregation and Jim Crow laws from the United States to Brazil, where this situation had never existed. During the dictatorship do Nascimento had to go into exile because of his opposition to authoritarianism, and only recently has he become a crucial voice to better understand ethnicity and race in Brazil. His ideas have been vindicated and resurrected among a number of black pride movements such as Olodum from Bahia, Black Rio and Articulation of Brazilian Black Women.

There has never been a unified national black social movement in Brazil. According to some analyses, in the late 1970s there were six hundred institutions that had racism as one of their main flags, including religious, sports, music, cultural and grassroots organizations. In 1978 the Unified Black Movement (Movimento Negro Unificado) was created with the aim of unifying all the scattered efforts and giving a political voice to the defense of the black movement (PNUD Brazil 2005). Although this attempt at unification failed, the institution was able to reach most of the country and gave new energy to the movement. Other institutions have appeared more recently, like the National Meeting of Black Institutions (Encontro Nacional de Entidades Negras-Enen), created in Sao Paulo in 1991, the National Coordination of Black Institutions (Coordenação Nacional de Entidades Negras-Conen) and the National Coordination of Quilombolas Communities (Coordenação Nacional de Comunidades Quilombolas-Conaq). There was a new and more recent mobilization, connected to the World Conference Against Racism which was held in Durban, South Africa, in 2001. While Brazil was preparing to participate in that meeting there was very significant debate about the whole question, and this was echoed in the public ambit with the First National Conference Against Racism and Intolerance in Rio de Janeiro. Besides this, after Durban the government set up a National Council to Fight Discrimination (Conselho Nacional de Combate a Discriminação). These movements and institutions have created a new consciousness about racial problems in the country, and they are supported by very convincing data that speaks volumes about racism in Brazil (Da Silva 2004, Htun 2005).

In the 1970 national census the question of race was taken out, and although it was again included in the census of 1980 the results were not published until two years later because it was feared they might damage the idea of harmonious ethnic relations. In fact, the results showed that, on average, blacks earned only 35%, and mulattoes only 45%, of a typical white person’s income (Skidmore 1992). Recent data confirm this inequality in many different ways. Only 4% of blacks reach university compared to 14% of whites. The University of Sao Paulo is one of the
most prestigious learning institutions in the country, but in 1994 only 2% of the 50,000 students were black. In the Human Development Index for 2001 Brazil ranked in 65th place out of 175 countries, but the country’s real position was very different if the calculations were made for blacks and whites separately: white Brazilians were 46th in the world but the black population ranked 107th (Paixão 2003). This same study showed that average income for whites was 2.64 times the minimum wage while for blacks the figure was 1.15. Life expectancy for whites was 72 years but for blacks it was 66. And the literacy rate among over-fifteens was 92% for whites and only 82% for blacks. According to data provided by the System of Information About Mortality (Ministry of Health) and IBGE, the mortality rate for white males between 20 and 24 years of age is 102.3 per thousand inhabitants, but the rate for young black males is 218.5.

The last census organized by the IBGE in 2000 included a question about the self-definition of skin color and it emerged that 54% of Brazilians defined themselves as white, 39% as mulatto, 6% as black, and only 1% used other categories to define their skin color. This result is very interesting in different ways. First, it shows clearly that even today the majority of the population feels that being black is a problem. It is not true that only 6% of the population is black, the percentage is much higher, but people don’t want to be perceived as black. This is probably the consequence of the generalized perception that to be white is to be in the upper part of the scale. Many of the mulattos would probably be considered black in other countries, and many whites would be seen as mulattos. But the results come from a self-definition of skin color, so the crucial dimension is precisely how people see themselves in terms of ethnicity. One of the most important aims of the black movement is to create a consciousness whereby people who are black stop being ashamed to define themselves as such, and there are even t-shirts with the slogan “100% black”. A second important result from the census is that there is enormous variation from one part of the country to another. We should bear in mind, of course, that the percentages of blacks is higher in the north than in the southeast. In the southern region 84% of the population define themselves as white and in the southeast 62%, but in the north and in the northeast only 30 and 32% respectively do so. These differences bring into focus the sharp regional contrasts in the country, and these can be symbolized by comparing the southern city of Curitiba in Parana, which has a very small black population, with the northern city of Salvador in Bahia, which is overwhelmingly black. Some time ago these ethnic differences, and also the economic success of the south and the greater poverty of the north, fueled separatists aspirations in the southern states. But still today it is very easy to recognize that a significant part of the southern white population mistrusts the northeastern states, and there is a contrast between at least two Brazils that have different ethnic, cultural and economic compositions.

The myth of racial democracy in Brazil –fed by Freyre’s writings, the absence of institutionalized racial segregation and the mixture of bloods– was rejected in the 1950s by sociologist Florestán Fernández and a few black militants. They perceived that, in spite of the fact that there was some truth in what Freyre said, Brazil had a very strong system of informal discrimination against blacks and indigenous populations. These voices opposing the myth of racial democracy were suppressed by the military dictatorships that ruled the country between 1964 and 1985, and it was not until democracy returned that, slowly, this view again emerged into the realm of public debate. In the 1988 Constitution ethnic and cultural diversity was recognized for the first time ever in Brazil, and the government acknowledged that it had a duty to protect different cultures and incorporate them into the identity of the nation. In that
Constitution, for the first time, racism was treated as a crime punishable with imprisonment without bail, and affirmative action policies were established. These policies consist of special scholarships for black and indigenous populations to prepare themselves for public competitions for state jobs, quotas for public-sector employment and universities, and financial assistance to study for the exam to enter public universities (Lloyd 2004a and b; Roberge 2006). Some states such as Bahia have reached the point of implementing quotas in the advertising industry. This last measure is very important because blacks are seriously under-represented in the media. One study found that on three of the main national TV channels in 59 hours at peak viewing time, black people appeared only in 39 advertisements, they only spoke in 9, and they only featured prominently in 4 (UNDP Brazil 2005). From 1.245 characters listed in 258 Brazilian novels 79.8% are white, 7.9% black and 6.1% mestizo. Also 84.5% of the main characters are white and only 5.8% black. The absolute majority of the black characters, 73.5%, are poor, and almost every character of the intellectual elite, 90%, is white (UNDP Brazil 2005).

Brazil’s indigenous peoples suffered systematic extermination, were expelled from their land and very few have survived. They now make up less than 1% of the population (recent estimations say 0.4%), and are divided into many little tribes. The 1998 Constitution, on chapter 8, article 231, recognizes that Indians have the right to their land, language and culture, and that the State must protect these rights. Actually, Brazilian authorities have declared as Indian reservation 12.5% of the country’s territory, quite an impressive percentage to such a small number of people, and it is the country that has performed better in Latin America on this matter.

Although the indigenous and black populations differ as to their numbers and history, they are in similar situations when it comes to cultural resistance today. Many of the Brazilian native populations identify themselves not with modern Brazil or a mixture of races, but with ancestral tribes and very specific, circumscribed epic histories and myths. In April 2004, in a remote area of the Amazon jungle in the Brazilian state of Rondonia that borders on Bolivia, the “Cinta Larga” natives killed twenty-nine diamond miners. The miners had been in an area that the FUNAI (the public institution in charge of the protection of indigenous rights) had declared a reservation for this native population. The natives claimed that they killed the miners in self-defense and in accordance with their ancient rules. The State found itself trapped in the dilemma of trying to impose the rule of law without violating the rights of indigenous people to autonomy and cultural diversity. These tribesmen first came into contact with white civilization in the 1960s, most of them still live in very simple conditions by hunting and fishing, but today most speak Portuguese and wear western clothes. Most Brazilian Indians live on reservations where the State gives them control of economic activity but retains ownership of sub-soil resources. Some of this land is extremely rich in minerals so it has to be defended against illegal mining, and some is menaced by development projects that are agricultural or have to do with building infrastructure. The latter is currently a problem on a reservation in Roraima, a northern state on the border with Venezuela. Lula’s government has decided on a policy of “disintrusion”, and the result here is that several cities have to be abandoned by non-indigenous people and that a number of very big rice plantations have to be re-located in other areas. Whether this solution can be workable as a defense for small tribes in Roraima or for the Amazon jungle is bitterly disputed by everyone involved who is not an Indian. The big farmers argue that it is stopping development, and the state authorities are worried because they say they will end up governing a virtual state with a very small population and most of the land under autonomous indigenous
control. In 2004 the Raposa-Serra Do Sol, the indigenous community in this area that has suffered the intrusion of gold miners (“garimpeiros”) and farmers for decades, decided to block the roads and all access to their lands, and appeared in the media in their traditional costumes and body paint.

Natives and blacks are both grounding their new identities in multicultural strategies. This means that they are giving more importance to the coexistence of equal but independent cultures than to the idea of miscegenation, which was the solution that prevailed in Brazil for many decades and became the mark of its identity as a nation. Ethnic conflict in Brazil has not yet escalated into massive political violence but there are innumerable confrontations happening all the time and they will go on. The challenge for Brazil is how to transform itself into a true racial democracy in which cultural diversity is respected while still holding together as a united nation.

Two areas in which blacks are now successful and accepted are music and sport, but there are other important examples of how the situation has improved. For example, Joaquim Benedito Barbosa Gomes was the first black in the history of Brazil to join the Supreme Court. When he was appointed by President Lula he said that when he had been asked about his chances he had answered: “I will never make it, for blacks it is impossible”. Another important example is Beneditta da Silva, who was born in a slum in Rio de Janeiro. In 1986 she was elected Federal Deputy, in 1994 she became the first black woman to sit in the senate, and then she became Governor of Rio de Janeiro and Minister of Social Action for Lula’s government. Another interesting example is the case of Gilberto Gil, a black from the northern state of Bahia who became famous as a singer: he was appointed as Minister of Culture by Lula. But still, even though half of the population is black or mulatto, Brazil has never had a black or a mulatto President. Sooner or later this will change, just as it changed in Bolivia where very recently the first ever indigenous president was elected in a country where the overwhelming majority of the electorate are Indians, or like what finally happened in South Africa with Mandela.

Bolivia and Peru: The Awakening of the Aymara and Quechua Nations

In April 2004, the same month that the “Cinta Larga” killed the miners, in the small village of Ilave near the Peruvian city of Puno, on the border with Bolivia, members of the Aymara community killed the mayor Cirilo Robles Callomamani in a street riot. They accused him of corruption, tied him to a post and stabbed him to death. His body was found under a bridge the next morning. Three other people were kidnapped and badly injured. The protest was supported by nearby Aymara communities in Bolivia and Peru, who blocked the highways. Although Mr. Robles was himself an Aymara, people from this and other communities now have the chance to elect their majors democratically, and they want them to be accountable for their actions. Like many border cities, the small city of Ilave is on a smuggling route and it is estimated that goods to the value of 200 million dollars travel along its dusty roads every year. The mayor had a stake in this underground economy but this was discovered, he was accused of corruption, and he had to move away from the city. When he found he was going to be formally dismissed from office he went back, but the angry citizens dragged him out of his house and killed him. One of his rivals was arrested for the crime. If this is an action within the Aymara
community and not against authorities of some other ethnic origin, the important issue is that the justice was administered by members of the local indigenous community themselves, which is a consequence of the absence of formal justice in this remote and marginalized area of Peru. It was not the first time that Aymaras have acted in that way. In October 2003 in the little Bolivian village of Pucarani by Lake Titicaca, Aymara followers of Felipe Quispe arrested two cattle rustlers and beat them to death, and said afterwards they had acted in accordance with their old indigenous traditions, or what is labeled as “customary law”. When the murderers were arrested, Quispe and his movement made a massive demonstration of force, blocking roads and highways confronting the police, and several people on both sides were killed (The Economist 2004a,b, and c).

In 1997 I spent several weeks in Peru and I was struck by a huge sign written in Hollywood-like words on the slopes of one of the mountains outside the city of Cuzco, saying PACHAKUTEK. When I asked the locals about this they told me it was an indigenous movement, and one of its main goals was to fight to maintain and reconstruct Inca identity and pride. Pachakutek (there are various other ways of writing the word like Pachacuti or Pachacute) was the name of one of the most famous Inca emperors, but it also means revival or reawakening in the Quechua language. On the same trip I also witnessed a peaceful street demonstration against the mayor of the city in which almost all the participants were native Incas. In Peru today there is a small and radical political movement called the Pachakutek Movement for the Liberation of Tahuantinsuyu (Movimiento Pachakutek para la Liberación del Tahuantinsuyu-MPLT). They claim their basic objective is to reconstruct the old Tahuantinsuyo Inca community and break free from the oppressive State of Peru, which is perceived as a continuation of the old colonial Spanish domination of their region and culture. While there are still no significant indigenous political parties in Peru, some Indians are winning political positions. For example, according to a study by the anthropologist Ivan Degregori, in the department of Ayacucho only one municipality in ten had a Quechua-speaking mayor in 1966, but thirty years later all ten mayors spoke the language, six had Quechua names and seven were of Inca origin (The Economist 2004b). Now there are indigenous movements in Ecuador (Larrea 2004) that use the name Pachakutek, and in the recent elections they came to power in many cities and provinces and helped the ex-President Lucio Gutiérrez to win the elections and put Jamil Mauad out of office, and they then forced Gutiérrez himself to resign because they felt he had betrayed them when he made an agreement with the IMF and relied on the United States for support.

There is also a Pachacute movement in Bolivia. The MIP (Indigenous Movement Pachacuti), whose leader is a native Aymara called Felipe Quispe, has contributed to the downfall of the last two Presidents: Gonzalo Sánchez de Losada (Goni) and Carlos Mesa. It won 6% of the votes in 2002 but in 2005 elections only 2%. If this is a political defeat against Morales, we should not be mistaken about Quispe’s still strong influence among Aymara people and his capacity to mobilize them when the time comes to fight Morales, who is been called a traitor. Pachacuti’s aim is to create a new sovereign country, the Republic of Quillasuyo (or Kollasuyu) named after one of the four regions of the old empire when the Incas conquered the Aymaras. In Quispe’s own words: “Indians are a majority in Bolivia (between 60 and 80% of the population), and as the historical majority we are decided to self govern, to dictate our own laws, to change the Constitution of the state for our Constitution, to change the capitalist system for
our communitarian system, to change the Bolivian flag of three colors for our seven color flag” (La jornada 2003). This new Republic will have also its own national anthem, its own symbols, it will be organized without money and there will be no economic inequality, “much as the way we are already living in many of our communities”, Quispe says. And he is ready to resume mobilization, on an interview in 2006 he answered that Pachakuti had “given ninety days to Morales, and after that they would pass to action, articulating indigenous organizations, unions and political leaders” (El Tiempo 2006).

The Aymara culture has remained relatively untouched by European influence because its center is located in the high lands around Lake Titicaca at 4,000 meters above sea level, an area called the Tibet of the Americas (Aymara Uta website). Under Quispe’s influence, the movement has created an identity of resistance (Castells 1997, Aroca 1997) and its selected enemies are the white population, the Catholic Church, the State of Bolivia, capitalism and globalization. They define themselves in ethnic and racial terms; they follow their own traditional religion with its center in the sun (Inti), the land (Pachamama) and the mountains (Apus); they have their own calendar, which reckons 5,511 years; they want to separate from Bolivia and create an independent state; and they will continue to organize their communities without a money market economy and outside globalization. Quispe is an ex-guerrilla leader (Ejército Guerrillero Túpaku Katari), he was in prison for five years and was freed in 1997, then he was elected Secretary General of one of the workers’ unions (Confederación Sindical Unión de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia-CSUCTB) and finally he founded his own political party, the MIP. His political rhetoric has gradually shifted from Marxist positions and the defense of traditional Andean communities (the ayllus), to a very nationalistic and separatist platform. He probably leads one of the most radicalized indigenous movements in Latin America. His political ideas are strongly influenced by Fausto Reinaga, a theorist who proposed the unification of Quechua and Aymaras and a social system based on their ancestral religiosity and cosmology. Reinaga has been severely criticized from the left, who say he is playing the game of the right against workers’ unions, and from the right because of his call for racial confrontation. If Quispe’s movement continues to grow, and some indications are that it will, there is a good chance that a new nation state made up of Quechus and Aymaras will emerge and try to take territory from Peru and Bolivia, splitting both countries. This could be the first time since the Spanish conquest that countries in Latin America fragmented for ethnic reasons.

Only a small minority of the Bolivian population is white, some 57%, a full majority, is Quechua or Aymara, another 25% is mestizo (half breed), and there are still few descendants of the Guarani Indians in the east of the country. Peru’s demographic composition is very similar to Bolivia’s: 45% are Quechua or Aymara, 37% mestizo and 15% white, 3% other ethnic origin. Indians are mainly in the Andes, on the coast there are mestizos, whites and a small number of blacks, and many small indigenous tribes still survive in the Amazon region bordering on Brazil (Bolivian Census 2001; UNDP 2004; Van Cott 2002; Guía del Tercer Mundo 2004). Peru and Bolivia have three official languages: Quechua, Aymara and Spanish, but there are many other local languages. In Bolivia, for example, more than half of the population speaks local languages, of which there are more than thirty. The indigenous population in both countries has been historically and systematically the poorest. According to a World Bank Report (1994), 64.3% of Bolivian indigenous people are poor, and in Peru 79.6%, been poor equal to live with less than two dollars a day.
Before the Spaniards conquered the Inca Empire, there was a multi-ethnic nation of Aymara, Quechua and other native cultures that made up a confederation of nations called Tahuantinsuyo, which included parts of what are now Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia and Chile. During the colonial period, due to their “natural inferiority” indigenous populations in Bolivia and Peru were segregated and marginalized, sometimes used as forced labor, others maintained apart in pseudo evangelized “Pueblos de indios” (Yrigoyen 2002). The Independence didn’t change much, because the new nations were constructed as images of Western, Catholic, and White countries with no place for Indians. Thus, national identity did not include indigenous populations nor their rights, and what emerged were nation-states without Indians, preoccupied with building one state, one population, and one homogenized nation, formed by Europeanized mestizos (Stavenhagen 2002). A special reference has to be made to the politics of Indigenismo, developed since the 1930s onwards, because there can be some mistaken perception due to its name. Indigenismo politics, even if it used well-educated rhetoric towards Indians, had as its objective the integration to society of the native population to make them useful citizens. Communication, education and integration policies were developed for this purpose of assimilating the indigenous population and aligning them with developmental policies; indigenous populations were referred as campesinos, in spite the label of Indigenismo (Marroquín 1972). But what was not included in these Indigenista projects was the recognition of their own cultures, with the right to language, collective property of land, and education in Quechua or Aymara. For that we still had to wait to the last decade of the twentieth century.

The current indigenous mobilization in the Andean region started to gain real strength in 1992, at the time of the celebrations for the five hundredth anniversary of the arrival of Columbus in the Americas. The Indians’ organizations, supported by a number of NGOs and with money flowing in from developed countries, shifted from demands for a kind of leftist agenda to demands much more centered on questions of ethnicity and autonomy, both cultural and territorial. This shift can also be described as a movement from assimilation to multiculturalism. This process can well be exemplified by the shift from the identification of campesino to indigenous; while the first is defined by the economic position in the productive process, the latter is associated with a specific cultural identity and history (Albó 1994; 2002). “In Peru, the international advocacy networks and conservationist alliances of Amazonian movements in the 1980 and 1990s helped create the ideological space necessary for Andeans to reevaluate their ‘peasant’ status and consider exchanging it for, or combining it with, that of ‘indigenous’” (Greene 2005). Particularly in Bolivia “after the 1952 Revolution, the MNR-run state used the sindicato (peasant union) model to bring highland Indians into the national economic and political schemes. In essence, this model was assimilationist in character, using and eliding the traditional land holding patterns and forms of social organization to make the varied Indian groups into campesinos, a group defined by class rather than ethnicity” (Postero 2000). Some of the Indians’ struggles since the 1990s stress exactly the opposite, the preeminence of ethnicity over class, of culture over political ideology. Both of these strategies are present nowadays and can be clearly identified in two different political movements that have grown from indigenous populations: the Movement To Socialism (Movimiento Acción Socialista-MAS) and the Indigenous Movement Pachacuti (Movimiento Indígena Pachacuti-MIP). The MAS is considered less radical than the MIP precisely because it plays by the accepted rules of politics, and even though it is leftist and radical its political agenda follows
more or less the same pattern of political ideology as in the past: socialism, nationalization, anti-imperialism, rights for the Indians and better living conditions. These demands can be defended in a more or less aggressive fashion, with more or less radical action, but they are demands that come from within the Bolivian political system. On the other hand, the rhetoric and identity of Quispe’s MIP are grounded outside the system and in opposition to it, and this is why it is seen as much more radical. Morales and Quispe sometimes acted together, but at other times Morales had to assume the voice of reasonableness to avoid plunging Bolivian politics into a storm that might fragment the country in who knows how many parts.

On December 18th 2005 Evo Morales became the first indigenous president of Bolivia, and he won the elections with 52% of the votes cast, an overall majority, which was also the first in the history of the country. His clear majority means he has been able to take power without making alliances in the Congress. Morales said, “(It is)...a great honor to be the first indigenous president ... a stage in history has ended, the neo-liberal model has come to an end and a model of doing politics has also finished.” Ex-president Carlos Mesa said, “It is necessary for the country to have one indigenous president.” Morales achieved his popularity as the defender of the peasants that live from the growing of the coca leaves. The United States pressured the Bolivian government to ban coca fields and promised in exchange to provide monetary aid so that the peasants and Indians would be able to convert to other crops. But their income from these other crops never came up to what they earned from coca and there was widespread discontent. For the peasants, coca is an ancient and traditional crop which is used for many purposes but not to make cocaine, although they do make their money selling the leaves to drug traffickers. Morales capitalized on this discontent and became known as the “cocalero leader”. The MAS, the largest political party in the country, say they do not seek to divide the Republic but to transform it. Isaac Bigio, a specialist in Bolivian conflicts from the London School of Economics, says that some think this is a synonym for shy reformism and conciliation with the whites (blancoides), while others believe it is a real and viable multicultural plan of action in the context of an interrelated capitalist world. Evo Morales could become the new indigenous Mandela who could end racial apartheid in the Andes, but alternatively he might become the head of a new bloody uprising, like the one that occurred fifty years ago (Bigio’s website 2002).

A very significant precedent for the success of these two movements and the importance that Aymara cultural identity has had in both was the appearance of “compadre” Palenque in the 1990s. Carlos Palenque started out as a Bolivian singer who created a radio and television media network, and he became so popular that he finally founded “Condepa” (Conciencia de Patria), a political party that, as his media shows, appealed to the feelings of Indians who had gone to live in urban La Paz. Palenque employed a mix of the Aymara and Spanish languages and drew on Indian religiosity and traditional cultures, he showed how this forgotten mass of desperate Indians who had been expelled from their homes and lands were living, and he identified with their lack of trust in traditional political rhetoric and political parties. Condepa grew very quickly, in only a few years Palenque’s wife, Mónica Medina, was elected mayor of the city of La Paz, and “compadre” Remedios Loza, who dresses in a very traditional indigenous style, was elected to congress. The movement was a product of “informational politics” (Castells 1997), it didn’t go in for radical rhetoric, it was opportunistic and populist, and it evaporated when Palenque died. But we must recognize that it was one of the few times when a sector of displaced Bolivian Indians have been addressed in their own language, shown their own images, and had
their own inner problems and feelings understood. The effect was strong empathy with their
daily resistance against a society that has excluded them and pushed into the marginal
netherworld on the outskirts of life where they have lost their dreams, their names and their
history.

Condepa also identified with middle class mestizos and Banzer’s government (an ex-
dictator of Bolivia), but this was rejected by the radical indigenous movement, and the MIP
became the most important voice speaking for the Aymaras. It is true that Quispe’s movement
cannot be labeled multicultural because its objective is to create a one-culture nation (Quechus
and Aymaras are considered to share one common culture), so probably the only way for Bolivia
to remain unified is to reinforce multiethnic policies regarding poverty and the distribution of
land. Land and poverty are two of the main problems for both Morales and Quispe because 97%
of the land is owned by 3% of the people while 93% of the people own only 7%.

Multiculturalism and Assimilation

I am using the terms assimilation and multiculturalism as two different integration
strategies followed by—or towards to—minority or subordinate ethnic groups to the rest of the
population in which they are inserted. The assimilation strategy consists of a process of
integration adopting as much as possible the cultural patterns of the dominant culture
—language, education, clothes, religiosity, or family relations. Assimilation can be a strategy
developed by the state, a public policy, by which different groups are forced or convinced with
specific benefits to adopt the dominant culture. But it can also be a strategy developed by the
groups themselves if they are convinced that it is the best way to integrate. The multicultural
strategy differs to the previous one because now the groups will try to integrate maintaining as
much as they can of their own culture, typically building hyphenated-identities, which express
their belonging to two nationalities at the same time. Again, multiculturalism can be a strategy
favored by the state, in which case the state must protect, recognize and grant cultural diversity.
But the community can also develop it. There is still a third way of “integration”, which is
neither assimilation nor multiculturalism, and this is segregation. This is the case when an ethnic
community lives in the middle of other people as much isolated as they can, without making the
effort to learn the new language, or create ties with the outer population; it is the typical case of
the ghettos. Of course, segregation can be also a strategy developed from the sates towards
certain ethnic groups that are not welcomed. These six analytical possibilities can be summarized
in the following table:
I will give six simple and well-known examples, one for each analytical case mentioned: i) segregation strategies from the state: USA policies towards blacks before the civil rights movement; ii) segregation strategies followed by the ethnic community: present Arab immigrants in Sweden; iii) assimilation strategies from the state: present French policy towards Muslims; iv) assimilation strategies followed by the community: Italians or Syrian-Lebanese in Brazil and Argentina since 1890; v) multicultural strategy designed by the state: Britain’s policy towards Pakistanis since 1980; vi) multicultural strategy followed by the minority group: present Hispanics in the USA. These examples can be summarized in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I. Analytical framework to understand strategies of integration towards/from ethnic groups</th>
<th>Segregation</th>
<th>Assimilation</th>
<th>Multiculturalism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>From the State (Public Policy)</td>
<td>No place in nation-state structure, no citizenship, racism</td>
<td>Promote complete integration</td>
<td>Recognize, defend and promote diversity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From the minority or subordinate group</td>
<td>Ghettos, temporary workers</td>
<td>Adopt mainstream culture</td>
<td>Dual identity, hyphenated identity</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Now we will look specifically at our case studies adding a timeline on top of the analytical framework to better understand the integration of indigenous and black populations in Brazil, Bolivia, and Peru. i) In the colonial regime, passing through the Independence until 1930, approximately, the strategies from the Brazilian, Bolivian and Peruvian states towards these groups were all based on their “natural inferiority”, so they were enslaved or marginalized and never considered a part of the nations; ii) throughout all this period there really was no strategy developed from the subordinate communities due to the extreme weakness of their situation; iii) approximately since 1930s-50s, with Indigenismo and nationalist ideology, indigenous populations and blacks were encouraged to assimilate to become useful citizens in the productive system. It is at this time also when the integration through mixtures of bloods becomes a part of national identity: Latin America as the mestizo continent, with its “cosmic race”, or miscegenated population, that avoided racial conflict and met harmonious integration of cultures; iv) indigenous and black populations followed at this period the statu quo and tried to assimilate accepting political cooptation, and giving their back to their ethnic origins: it was better to be considered a campesino than an Indian, and mulatto was better than black or Afro-Brazilian, as campesinos, mestizos and mulattos, were a little whiter and a little more like the dominant stereotype; v) since the 1990s to present the three states have started an approach of multicultural integration, reforming their constitutions, promoting and recognizing cultural and ethnic diversity; vi) the communities also have developed multicultural strategies attempting to become a part of the countries without giving away their own cultural identity. Indians identify as indigenous populations with their languages, beliefs and life styles and blacks and mulattos start to incorporate the identification as blacks or Afro-Brazilians. Both populations are fighting for their right to become citizens without discrimination expanding or changing past national identities that did not take them into account.

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<th>3. Analytical framework to understand strategies of integration towards/from blacks and Indians in Brazil, Bolivia and Peru</th>
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<td>Segregation &amp; Assimilation</td>
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<td>(Colonial period, Indigenismo)</td>
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<td>Examples (Since 1930s until beginning 1990s)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Multiculturalism</td>
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<tr>
<td>From the State Public Policy (Public Policy)</td>
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<tr>
<td>From the minority or subordinate group</td>
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<tr>
<td>Slavery: marginalization, “scientific racism”</td>
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<tr>
<td>Integration through miscegenation-mestizaje</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constitutional reforms, new national identities</td>
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<tr>
<td>USA policy towards blacks before civil rights movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>Present French policy towards Muslims</td>
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<td>Italy's policy towards identity recognition; Afrot-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brazilian, Aymara, Quechua identity</td>
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<tr>
<td>No strategy completely dominated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accept political cooptation, shame of ethnic identity</td>
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<tr>
<td>Italians or Syrian Lebanese in Brazil</td>
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<tr>
<td>mulatto over black, and Argentina since 1890</td>
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Brazil, Bolivia and Peru are clear examples of the difficulties in harmonizing multiculturalism with the necessary level of unity and identity in a country. First and foremost a nation is a cultural definition, it is a shared group of facts, values, ideas and mores that have acquired common meaning over the years in a constructed history, perceived as different from other nations’ histories. This is the root of cultural identity, which in the modern world normally crystallizes, at its more generic level, around a nation-state. But national frontiers have become more undefined and problematic as the spread of globalization challenges the survival of states from outside while local communities challenge them from within their borders. The consequence of this is the growth of new nationalisms that are sometimes supranational and sometimes sub-national, but that usually do not match the borders of the states. If this problem is not well resolved the result could be violent conflicts, ideologically grounded in erroneous conceptions of national or cultural identities (like the extreme racism that exploded in the former Yugoslavia, for example), or political solutions that take the wrong path (as in the case of ethnic, cultural, or religious fundamentalism). Will the multicultural strategies that have been adopted by different ethnic communities in Brazil, Peru and Bolivia affect the national unity of these countries? Will these countries survive as unified states? Will this multiculturalism and the new appeal of ethnic consciousness evolve to a positive regeneration of miscegenation ideas, like Freyre’s, or to Jose Vasconcelos’s ideas of the Latin American mestizo as the “cosmic race”? What is the risk that this new multiculturalism will evolve into fundamentalist positions?

After the fall of the Berlin wall a number of new countries emerged by seceding from older nations because different peoples felt they were not represented in the larger state. This happened in Europe with Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, it happened with several republics of the Soviet Union, it happened in Africa with Eritrea and in Asia with East Timor. Up until now no Latin American state has split into parts but this doesn’t mean that it cannot happen. On the contrary, the chances of this happening are increasing very quickly in Bolivia.

The central subject of analysis in the 2004 Human Development Report Cultural Liberty
in Today’s Diverse World is the current necessity to build multicultural democracies, and the difficulties on the path to achieving that. The idea is that respect for cultural diversity should be considered a major goal of development itself, and, in this sense, it is an ethic matter. But accepting diversity also has a very practical consequence because it is probably the only way of diminishing conflicts between ethnic and religious communities that are clashing violently in many parts of the world. The Report “makes a case for respecting diversity and building more inclusive societies by adopting policies that explicitly recognize cultural differences—multicultural policies. But why have many cultural identities been suppressed or ignored for so long? One reason is that many people believe that allowing diversity to flourish may be desirable in the abstract but in practice can weaken the state, lead to conflict and retard development. The best approach to diversity, in this view, is assimilation around a single national standard, which can lead to the suppression of cultural identities. However, this Report argues that these are not premises— they are myths. Indeed, it argues that a multicultural policy approach is not just desirable but also viable and necessary. Without such an approach the imagined problems of diversity can become self-fulfilling prophecies” (UNDP 2004). The “myth” which is contested in this assertion is that there is not necessarily a trade off between multiculturalism and the capability of a nation state to maintain its required levels of unity. What is more, a multicultural policy may be the only way for a number of states to avoid secession. There is some truth in this claim, but neither of the two problems is that simple.

First, we must acknowledge that there is tension between multiculturalism and the unity of a state. Of course, this tension can be solved in many ways, with positive or negative solutions, but the tension will remain, at least potentially. Second, multicultural policies can be good to help marginalized populations and compensate for past discrimination, but they carry in themselves the difficulty that they might become unconstitutional because they could easily violate the principle of equality before the law, or fall into reverse discrimination, which has given rise to ongoing debates about affirmative action. Brazil recently adopted a system of quotas for black people, but at the same time the United States outlawed the use of this method as a way to compensate past discrimination, and doubts have been raised about whether it can work as a system to promote diversity. “How far Brazil will go down the road of quotas is impossible to say. Obviously, many conditions—social, cultural, ideological, and economic— in Brazil differ sharply from those in the United States. But it is also worth remembering that quota systems—of whatever content—are now widely used in India and other nations of Latin America—even as they have become illegal here. Has Brazil come full circle in its racial practice? Are Brazilians now beginning to embrace the very measures they once denounced as inappropriate for Brazil's "racial democracy"? It is too soon to say. As a foreign observer, I would guess that white guilt over past discrimination is weaker in Brazil than in the United States. This may mean there will be stronger resistance to racially oriented remedial action than has proved the case in North America” (Skidmore 2003).

The large amount of data that has recently been published clearly proves that Brazil suffers from the burden of racism and that black individuals are discriminated against whites, even if both have the same levels of education or the same working positions. Two very important laws based on affirmative action policies are now under scrutiny —The Statute for the Equality of Race, and The Quota Law— and the arguments supporting or criticizing them are reshaping what Brazilians thought about their democratic racial integration. For example, one
book’s title is very suggestive: *We Are Not Racists* (Kamel 2006), and it attempts a defense of the harmonious integration. On the contrary, on the justification that senator Paulo Paim (2006) does of The Statute, Brazil is perceived as a country with chronic racism, and blacks and mulattos are redefined as Afro-Brazilians, classification that according to the new law should inform a wide range of public policies based on affirmative action and quotas. This new hyphenated identity and the discussion of the racial question are reshaping Brazil’s national identity (Downie 2001; Telles 2001; Lobato 2003; Ferreira 2007).

Quota systems and affirmative action have not been implemented in Bolivia and Peru, but indigenous populations know very well that they must mobilize to make the governments take the action that is needed to protect their cultures and guarantee equal rights. In some cases, as in Quispe’s movement, there are signs of extremism, and it is not clear where this will lead. It is not difficult to understand their frustration because discrimination has been so cruel and has gone on for so long. It is precisely because of this that multicultural policies have to be strengthened, and quickly, as they are the best defense against separation and radicalization. Racial mixing has not been successful in bringing about integration, and assimilation theories are just a way of sweeping the problem under the carpet. Grandiose ideas such as a cosmic race, racial democracy and ethnic mixtures have not diminished the poverty, the lack of education, the exploitation and the inequalities that these populations suffered to a far greater extent than white Latin Americans. The inclination to move towards radicalized positions will be fueled if real attempts to promote anti-discriminatory measures are not perceived or are ignored.

Conclusions

Brazilian ethnic identity is at a crucial moment of redefinition. What appeared in the past to be successful integration of races is now under searching scrutiny. Black movements have efficiently deconstructed the hegemonic self-image that the country is a positive model for democratic coexistence between different ethnic groups. Many foreigners of African descent who visit Brazil have been surprised to find themselves faced with subtle forms of discrimination. Awareness of the problem has reached government institutions, and legislation has been passed to mitigate racial discrimination in different ways, but there is still a long way to go not only as regards Afro-Brazilians but also for indigenous peoples, who are less organized and find it much harder to access public opinion. Ethnic discrimination is also being seriously debated in Bolivia and part of Peru. In these countries it is not related to a black population but to indigenous Aymaras and Quechus who have their roots in pre-colonial civilization. These people are mobilizing in a strong movement that is built around the defense of their indigenous cultures and rights. But in Bolivia part of this movement has reached the point of segregation, thus stepping aside from a multicultural strategy of integration, and it is demanding the creation of a new nation state, which would be the first partition of a South American nation since the United States forcibly broke Panama off from Colombia. The specter of separation is starting to appear less like a phantom and more like a real embodied figure.
It is no coincidence that in the very different social, historical and demographic contexts of Brazil, Bolivia and Peru, and in a little more than a decade, the notions of miscegenation and mestizaje have been challenged. This questioning of two core concepts in Latin American identity is linked to the process of globalization and its dialectic consequence of a new consciousness that stresses the importance of defending cultural diversity. At present, multiculturalism is becoming the main strategy for integrating different cultures within a nation state or a territory. At the same time as this trend towards multiculturalism, ethnic groups in Brazil, Bolivia and Peru that have long suffered discrimination are constructing new identities in opposition to white, western domination and even against the democratic side of the mixture of races and cultures. These new identities are anchored in different systems of symbols constructed from ancient ethnic heroes (Zumbi, Pachacutec), alternative religions (Afro-Brazilian religions, pre-colonial myths), territorial autonomy (quilombos, indigenous reservations, communal lands), pre-colonial histories (Africa, Tahantinsuyu, Kollasuyo) music (samba-reggae, Andean rhythms), and physical appearance (skin color, phenotype), among other sources of inspiration. All these together are bringing about profound changes in national identities in Brazil, Bolivia and Peru, three countries that will have to learn to build new multicultural and multiethnic democracies. All three have recognized this in their most recent Constitutional amendments, which all acknowledge pluri-ethnic or multinational societies. This is a big step, and it should be followed up with practical solutions.

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